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Signal detection theorya b s t r a c t
In this study we investigated the influence of list composition on judgments of learning
(JOLs). To this end, we compared JOLs assigned in a multi-cycle procedure to a set of mod-
erately difficult word pairs. Experiment 1 revealed that when difficult new pairs were
added to the study list, the mean of JOLs assigned to the moderate pairs increased as com-
pared to the baseline. In Experiment 2, we reversed this pattern by including easy new
pairs in the study list. By analyzing metacognitive ROCs (MROCs), we demonstrate that
these results were caused by criterion shifts, by which participants adjusted the level of
evidence needed to assign particular JOL ratings. Changes in the study list composition
led to a recalibration of the JOL scale – i.e. resetting of the criteria – in order to accommo-
date the addition of new items. We discuss the usefulness of MROCs for detecting criterion
shifts in rating tasks.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Rating scales are ubiquitous in psychological research.
In general, the scales used by psychologists can roughly
be divided into two groups (e.g., Biernat, Manis, &
Nelson, 1991; Frederick & Mochon, 2012). Subjective scales
are characterized as having no predetermined meaning:
the interpretation of the points on these scales cannot be
inferred a priori, without taking into account what the rat-
ings actually refer to. For example, on a scale ranging from
very small to very large, the precise meaning of the labels
depends on the range of sizes of to-be-rated items. With
such scales, there is no contradiction that a very small
mammal can still be larger than a very large insect. Objec-
tive scales, on the other hand, have predefined, objectivereferents. The interpretation of, say, weight in grams
should always be the same, independent of whether the
animal being weighed is an insect or a mammal.
In memory and metamemory research, researchers
commonly use measures such as retrospective confidence
(RC) judgments, and prospective measures such feeling-
of-knowing (FOK) judgments or judgments of learning
(JOLs), amongst others, to investigate internal assessments
of participants’ own knowledge. Often the scales metacog-
nitive theorists use are subjective, such as a 1-to-6 scale of
RC.1 Metacognitive studies employing subjective scales are
often concerned with resolution – that is, the extent to which
the assigned scale values discriminate between correct ver-
sus incorrect responses on some criterial test (e.g., correctly
recalled vs. not correctly recalled on a recall test following a
JOL judgment; correctly recognized vs. not correctly recog-
nized on a recognition test following an FOK judgment,
etc.). For resolution, the absolute magnitude of judgments
2 Luna, Higham, and Martín-Luengo (2011) observed similar correspon-
dence between likelihood ratings and RC ratings in a retrospective task.
3 With binary tasks, realism would be evident if the percentage of ‘‘yes”
responses (i.e., binary JOL: ‘‘yes, I will remember the item later”; binary
betting: ‘‘yes, I am willing to bet that I will recall the item later”) equaled
the percentage of items actually recalled.
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between these two types of responses. So, for example, if a
person assigned FOK ratings of 6 to all subsequently recog-
nized items, the same perfect resolution would be obtained
as long as they assigned any ratings lower than 6, be it 5 or 1,
to all subsequently unrecognized items. Popular measures of
resolution, such as gamma correlations or signal detection
measures of d0, da, or area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve can be calculated from an ordinal
scale, and a subjective 1-to-6 scale satisfies this
requirement.
The same metacognitive ratings can also be elicited on
objective scales, such as 0–100% scales of subjective prob-
ability. In order for this scale to be interpreted as objective,
the scale values must have some pre-set referents. It is
assumed that they refer to the likelihood of some outcome
in the long run (a frequentist approach to probability). In
the case of JOLs, a rating of 40% would mean, then, that a
person predicts recalling at a future test 40% of all items
assigned this rating.
Objective metacognitive scales have one notable advan-
tage over their subjective counterparts: they allow for an
additional measure of metacognitive accuracy to be calcu-
lated which reflects the correspondence between ratings
and objective performance: calibration. Calibration can be
assessed at separate levels on the rating scale (e.g., per-
centage correct is calculated separately for all items
assigned a rating of 0–9, 10–19, ..., 90–99, 100% and then
ratings and percentage correct are compared at each level),
or for the whole test. In both cases, perfect calibration (or
realism) requires that the means corresponding to objec-
tive performance are equal to mean ratings assigned to
the items. On the other hand, a rating mean that is lower
than the performance mean is interpreted as underconfi-
dence, whereas the reverse pattern is interpreted as over-
confidence. Therefore, it is assumed that by having
participants use the objective 0–100% JOL scale, researchers
can gain insight into how good they are at estimating, in
objective terms, their overall level of knowledge. Calibra-
tion scores have been used by experimenters to draw con-
clusions about potential similarities or differences in
monitoring abilities in developmental research (e.g.,
Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Lipko, Dunlosky,
Lipowski, & Merriman, 2012; Rast & Zimprich, 2009), eye-
witness research (e.g., Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2005;
Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010) and educational
research (e.g., Butler, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2008;
Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012), among many other areas of
psychology.
However, some concerns regarding the interpretation of
the 0–100% JOL scale have been formulated in the JOL liter-
ature. Recently, Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, Pasek, and
Higham (2013; see also Higham, Zawadzka, &
Hanczakowski, 2016; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015) cast
doubt on the likelihood interpretation of percentage JOLs.
Their research concerned the underconfidence-with-
practice (UWP) effect (see, e.g., Finn & Metcalfe, 2007,
2008; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002), an impairment of
calibration present when the same materials are studied
and tested more than once. In a typical UWP experiment,
participants first study a list of (typically unrelated)cue–target pairs such as digit-hunger. During study, they
assign JOLs to each item to indicate how likely it is that
they will later remember the target of the pair if provided
with the cue on an immediate cued-recall test following
study. Following the list, a recall test is administered and
performance on this test is compared to JOLs assigned dur-
ing study. On this first test, participants are typically well
calibrated or there is slight overconfidence. Following the
first test, the entire procedure is repeated at least once so
that the whole experiment consists of two or more identi-
cal study-test cycles. However, unlike the results from the
first cycle, from the second cycle onward, participants are
typically underconfident; that is, their JOLs underestimate
their actual recall.
Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al. (2013) noted that the
UWP effect was independent of the instructions given to
participants regarding the interpretation of JOLs. In most
studies participants were cued at study with a prompt ask-
ing them to rate the likelihood of recalling the target at
test, such as ‘‘With what probability will you remember
the target word in about five minutes from now if you
see the cue word?” (Rast & Zimprich, 2009). Instructions
like these should, at least in theory, convey to participants
that the JOL task is in fact a probability rating task, and so
the JOL scale is an objective one, with JOL values indicating
assessed probability of recall. However, some researchers
have used JOL prompts that did not mention the constructs
of probability or likelihood at all, and asked instead about
confidence (e.g., Scheck & Nelson, 2005; Serra & Dunlosky,
2005). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the likelihood
and confidence prompts are profoundly different on a the-
oretical level, there was no difference in the accuracy (as
assessed by calibration) of likelihood- and confidence-
prompted JOLs.2 This led Hanczakowski, Zawadzka et al. to
question whether participants in the percentage JOL task
were really aiming to maximize calibration. If they were
not, this would be consistent with findings from the judg-
ment and decision making literature suggesting that partic-
ipants do not aim at assessing calibration even if they are
provided with direct instructions to do so and examples of
what calibration entails (Keren & Teigen, 2001;
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1981).
For this reason, Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al. (2013)
decided to assess the generalizability of the UWP effect
to different rating types, such as binary yes/no JOLs and
binary betting decisions.3 They argued that if the UWP
effect was found with ratings other than 0–100% JOLs, it
would be consistent with the claim that this effect reflects
inaccurate assessments of the likelihood of future recall.
However, what Hanczakowski, Zawadzka et al. found is that,
in contrast to the underconfidence observed with the
percentage-JOL scale, the proportion of ‘‘yes” responses on
later cycles with the binary tasks did not differ from the pro-
portion of correctly recalled items, revealing good calibra-
4 Note that this interpretation of the 0–100% JOL task could explain why
binary yes/no judgments fare better at predicting future recall
(Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al., 2013), as well as reduce dual-task costs
stemming from the requirement for concurrent learning and providing
monitoring judgments (Mitchum, Kelley, & Fox, 2016), as compared to 0–
100% JOLs.
5 Here we refer to the evidence dimension as representing evidence for
future recall, as this is what participants are supposed to rate in the JOL
task. However, the exact nature of this internal dimension need not be
precisely specified (see e.g., Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).
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sociations observed with the different scales, their findings
suggested that participants were assigning low JOLs to items
they believed they would ultimately recall (see also
Zawadzka & Higham, 2015).
Following up on research by Hanczakowski, Zawadzka,
et al. (2013) and Zawadzka and Higham (2015) investi-
gated the assignment of the highest JOLs in a procedure
consisting of three study-test cycles. The results demon-
strated that JOLs made on cycle 3 in this multi-cycle proce-
dure were higher for items previously recalled twice (on
both preceding cycles) than for items recalled only once
(on one or the other preceding cycles). This difference in
JOLs, however, was not accompanied by a difference in
recall performance: all previously recalled items were
extremely likely (>90%) to be recalled again on cycle 3.
Importantly, when participants were given a binary betting
task instead of the 0–100% scale-JOL task in Experiment 2
of Zawadzka and Higham, they were able to correctly pre-
dict future recall with their bets. This demonstrates that
even though participants were aware that recall would
be comparable and at ceiling for both classes of items
(evinced by the binary-betting data), discriminations were
made between the item classes using their percentage JOLs
(evinced by the percentage-JOL data).
The findings of Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al. (2013)
and Zawadzka and Higham (2015) suggested that partici-
pants were assigning low JOLs to items they believed they
would ultimately recall. This, in turn, suggested that it
might be more accurate to interpret JOLs as confidence
judgments rather than assessments of likelihood. Confi-
dence judgments differ from likelihood judgments in one
important aspect: the scale on which confidence judg-
ments are made may well be subjective, whereas it is not
with likelihood judgments. Subjective scales are not con-
ducive to assessment of calibration because the scale val-
ues have no absolute meaning; it is not possible to
conclude that participants are realistic if items assigned a
rating of 40% have a 40% recall probability any more than
if those same items were assigned 4 on a six-point scale.
There are also other reasons suggesting that the 0–100%
JOL scale may not satisfy the objectivity assumption.
Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, and Rawson (2005) reached the
same conclusion as Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al.
(2013) and Zawadzka and Higham (2015) by examining
second-order judgments (SOJs) about JOLs. In their study,
for each studied word pair participants were asked to
assess the likelihood of recalling the target when presented
with the cue on a 0–100% scale, and then, on the same
scale, assess their confidence in the accuracy of that JOL
– a SOJ. The results revealed markedly lower SOJs for inter-
mediate JOL values than for extremes of the JOL scale. Dun-
losky et al. argued that this dissociation between JOLs and
SOJs reflects two separate processes that are involved in
assigning JOLs. The first process leads to a binary yes/no
decision being made regarding the predicted retrieval out-
come at test. This yes/no decision is then followed by accu-
mulation of supporting evidence. The more evidence for or
against future recall that is gathered during this stage, the
higher the final JOL. According to this interpretation, a JOL
of 60% does not reflect a 60% probability of future recall,but rather relatively weak evidence in favor of future recall
success.4
How, then, should the 0–100% JOL scale be interpreted?
We believe that analyzing JOLs from a signal detection the-
ory (SDT) perspective can be useful in answering this ques-
tion. Although interpreting metacognitive judgments in
terms of SDT is still relatively rare, it is not unheard of
(e.g., Ferrell & McGoey, 1980; Hanczakowski, Pasek,
Zawadzka, & Mazzoni, 2013; Hanczakowski, Zawadzka,
et al., 2013; Higham, 2007, 2011, 2013). In the remainder
of this paper, we describe a signal-detection account of
the 0–100% JOL scale (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Masson &
Rotello, 2009) and assess the consequences of such an
approach.A signal-detection account of JOLs
Fig. 1 shows a signal-detection representation of the 0–
100% JOL task. Two distributions of studied items are posi-
tioned on an evidence-for-future-recall dimension.5 On
average, items that will be recalled at a later point have
stronger evidence for future recall than later unrecalled
items; therefore the distribution of later recalled items is
positioned to the right of the distribution of later unrecalled
items (i.e., further up the evidence dimension). The distance
between the means of the two distributions shows how well
people are able to distinguish between later recalled and
unrecalled items – that is, how good their resolution is.
Scale values are treated as separate criteria that are mal-
leable and under participants’ control. The criteria, denoted
by vertical lines in the figure, indicate the minimum
amount of evidence that is needed for a given rating to
be assigned. The distributions are partitioned by these cri-
teria and each of the criteria is assigned a particular JOL
value, in this example in increments of 20. The rule for
assigning a JOL to any item sampled from the distributions
is straightforward: the item is assigned the JOL value cor-
responding to the criterion closest to it on the left-hand
side (i.e., the nearest criterion with evidence less than or
equal to the item’s evidence). Thus, an item that falls
between the 40% and 60% criteria will be assigned 40%.
However, if it has enough evidence to exceed the 60% crite-
rion as well (but not the 80% criterion), it will be assigned
60%. Critically, the positioning of the criteria on the evi-
dence dimension is not static but varies depending on sit-
uational context and task demands. For example, if the
experimental situation calls for a large amount of evidence
before assigning a given rating (i.e., the situation creates a
conservative decision strategy), the further to the right the
criterion for that rating is located.
Fig. 1. A signal-detection representation of the JOL task. Two distributions are placed on the evidence-for-future-recall dimension. The distributions on the
left versus the right represent items not recalled versus recalled on a given cycle, respectively. Vertical lines denote separate criteria. For a JOL of, say, 20%,
the evidence for that item must exceed the 20% criterion, but fall below the 40% criterion. In order for the highest rating (100%) to be assigned, the evidence
must exceed the highest criterion.
Fig. 2. An example of a metacognitive receiver operating characteristic
(MROC) curve. Points on the curve denote separate confidence criteria.
The most liberal criterion (0%) is placed in the top right corner, while the
most conservative criterion (100%) is at the end of the curve in the bottom
left part of the figure. HR = hit rate; FAR = false alarm rate.
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receiver operating curves (MROCs) to be plotted. A MROC
is a isosensitivity curve (i.e., resolution is the same at all
points on the MROC) that displays the relationship
between hit rates (HRs) and false alarm rates (FARs). An
example of a MROC is presented in Fig. 2. To generate such
an MROC, for each JOL level (e.g., in increments of 20, i.e. 0,
20, 40, ..., 100%), the proportion of recalled items which
were assigned a given JOL or higher (HR) is plotted against
the proportion of unrecalled items which were assigned a
given JOL or higher (FAR). For example, if a person assigned
a JOL of 40% or higher to four out of 10 unrecalled (or incor-
rectly recalled) items, and to 16 out of 20 correctly recalled
items, then the coordinates of the point on the MROC cor-
responding to the value of 40% would be (0.4, 0.8). These
points on the MROC denote separate criteria, showing the
minimum amount of evidence for future recall that is nec-
essary for a given JOL value to be assigned. The proportion
of the unit square that falls below the MROC curve gives a
measure of resolution known as the area under the curve
(AUC). The better a person is at using the JOL values to dis-
criminate between items that will and will not be recalled
at test, the greater the AUC. If JOLs perfectly discriminate
between subsequently recalled and unrecalled items, AUC
equals 1.0. Conversely, if JOLs only discriminate at chance
levels (i.e., HR = FAR for all MROC points), the MROC fol-
lows the minor diagonal of the plot, and the AUC equals
0.5.Context dependence of JOL values
The signal detection approach can shed new light on the
claims concerning the 0–100% JOL scale. If JOL values are
treated as separate criteria, the behavior of these criteria
under certain manipulations can be informative of how
people map subjective confidence onto the percentage-
JOL scale. Here, we will concentrate on whether the inter-
pretation of 0–100% JOLs is affected by the context of a
study list.
Context dependence of JOLs has been suggested by
Koriat (1997), who noted that JOLs are comparative and
driven by the relative recallability of items within a list.
However, list-context effects have also been documented
in studies in which recallability did not differ between
the types of items presented within the same list. For
example, Susser, Mulligan, & Besken (2013; Experiment
1) followed up on Rhodes and Castel’s (2008) research on
the effect of font size on JOLs and recall. Previously, Rhodesand Castel demonstrated that JOLs assigned to items pre-
sented in a larger font are higher than those assigned to
items presented in a smaller font, even though font size
has no effect on recall performance. Susser et al. found,
however, that this effect was limited to mixed lists that
consisted of both items presented in a small and large font.
When the list was pure (i.e., consisting solely of items
shown in either a large or in a small font), the effect of font
size on JOLs disappeared. Similarly, Zawadzka and Higham
(2015, Experiment 1) revealed differences in JOLs for previ-
ously recalled items despite equated recall performance
(see above).
Context effects on JOLs such as those observed by
Susser et al. (2013) suggest that the range of evidence for
future recall, which would have been greater in the
mixed-compared to the pure-study-list condition, might
be critical to understanding calibration. To illustrate how
the SDT model described above might account for such
effects using an example more similar to our own research,
consider two groups of participants who are presented
with a list of word pairs. For the first moderate-narrow-
range group, the list consists of pairs of moderate difficulty
only (henceforth referred to as critical pairs). For the sec-
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ficult word pairs on the list. For example, the moderate
word pairs might consist of unrelated words (muscle-
rainbow), whereas the hard word pairs might consist of
nonwords (cament-fissel). In both cases, participants pro-
vide immediate JOLs for each of the word pairs, and later
they are given a cued-recall test.
Fig. 3 depicts these two scenarios. In the moderate-
narrow-range group (middle panel), two distributions are
positioned toward the center of the evidence-for-future-
recall dimension with the distribution of unrecalled items
on the left, and the distribution of recalled items on the
right. In the hard-wide-range group (top panel), there are
two distributions of unrecalled items: one for critical pairs,
and one for difficult pairs. (For simplification, we assume
that none of the targets from difficult pairs was recalled,
so there is no distribution for recalled difficult pairs.) The
unrecalled difficult-pair distribution is located further to
the left of the unrecalled critical-pair distribution, because,
on average, the evidence for future recall is weaker for the
former pair type. Thus, the range of evidence is greater for
the mixed list of critical and difficult pairs compared to the
pure list of critical pairs.
Alternatively, the range of evidence can be extended in
the other direction by adding easy new pairs (e.g., related
pairs such as doctor–nurse) to create an easy-wide-range
group. This scenario is presented in the bottom panel of
Fig. 3. (For simplification, we assume that all easy word
pairs were recalled, so there is no distribution for unre-
called easy word pairs.) This time, the new, recalled,
easy-item distribution is located to the right of the recalled
critical-item distribution, because, on average, evidence is
greater for the easy than for the critical pairs. The addition
of new, easy items again extends the experienced range of
evidence as compared to the pure list of moderate critical
word pairs in the middle panel.
How might the difference in range of evidence for
future recall influence criterion setting? We propose that
participants adjust their criteria to accommodate the range
of evidence that they experience. However, rather than all
the criteria being adjusted, the adjustment is limited to
those criteria in the relevant range of evidence. This selec-
tive adjustment of criteria is shown in Fig. 3 by comparing
the top and middle panels. Note that only the lower criteria
(those associated with JOLs of 20%, 40%, and 60%) are
decreased to accommodate the low evidence of the hard
items. The upper criteria remain static. On the other hand,
a comparison of the middle and bottom panels of Fig. 3
shows the opposite criteria adjustment pattern; that is,
only the higher criteria (i.e., those associated with 60%,
80%, and 100%) are increased to accommodate the inclu-
sion of easy items, whereas the low criteria remain static.
By making selective criterion adjustments in this way, dif-
ferent JOL values can be used to effectively discriminate
between items that differ in evidence for their future
recall.
Experimental overview
In two experiments, we tested the prediction that the
assignment of JOL values depends on the range of experi-enced evidence for future recall. Range of evidence was
manipulated by including new items in the study list. In
the control conditions of both experiments, participants
studied and were tested on the same list of items on all
cycles, as it is commonly done in the multi-cycle paradigm.
In the experimental conditions, some of the studied items
were substituted on cycle 2 with new items in order to
extend the range of evidence for future recall for the whole
list. In Experiment 1, these new items (new unrelated word
pairs, and nonword–word pairs) were more difficult than
the critical items (i.e. items studied on all cycles), which
was intended to extend the range of evidence downward.
We predicted that this would affect specifically the lower
confidence criteria, as the lowest confidence values would
be reserved for the difficult new items. As a result, the
placement of these criteria on the evidence dimension
should be more liberal (i.e., less evidence would be needed
for an item to surpass these criteria) in the experimental
than in the control condition. In Experiment 2, in order
to extend the range upward, the new items (pairs studied
repeatedly before the multi-cycle procedure, and pairs in
which the cue and the target were the same word) were
easier than the critical items. We expected this manipula-
tion to affect the higher confidence criteria, which should
become more conservative (i.e., more evidence would be
needed for an item to surpass these criteria). Note that
the addition of new items should have no influence on
the evidence for future recall for the critical old items.
If our manipulations were successful, the assignment of
JOLs to critical items should be affected, but no effect on
recall is anticipated. Compared to the control conditions,
in which no new items were added, changes in the JOL
mean in the experimental group will necessarily affect
the magnitude of the difference between the JOL and recall
means – a common measure of calibration. In Experiment
1, an apparent decrease in underconfidence in the experi-
mental condition, as compared to the control condition,
should be found. On the other hand, in Experiment 2, this
apparent underconfidence should increase in the experi-
mental condition compared to the control condition.Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Sixty students of the University of Southampton partic-
ipated for course credit. Thirty were assigned to the control
group and 30 to the experimental group.Materials and procedure
The procedure consisted of three study-test cycles. On
cycle 1, participants in both groups studied and were
tested on the same list of 60 unrelated pairs. The pairs
were created from 120 words of medium frequency and
ranging from four to eight letters in length, chosen from
the MRC database. On cycles 2 and 3, participants in the
control condition were presented and tested on the same
60 pairs as on cycle 1. In the experimental condition, only
20 critical pairswere the same as those on cycle 1 (and thus
easy
wide range






Fig. 3. A graphical illustration of predictions of the bias account. Solid curves represent distributions for critical items, with the unrecalled-item distribution
on the left, and the recalled-item distribution on the right. The dotted line below the evidence dimension represents the experienced range of evidence. The
middle panel (moderate, narrow range) represents a case in which only critical items of moderate difficulty are studied. The top panel (hard, wide range)
includes, in addition to critical items, a dashed leftmost distribution of very difficult new items. The dashed rightmost distribution in the bottom panel
(easy, wide range) represents the easy new items distribution. Vertical dashed lines represent confidence criteria. The bias account predicts shifts only of
criteria that are relatively close to the new item distribution. In the top panel, this is evidenced by a shift of the lower criteria to the left of the evidence
dimension, and in the bottom panel by a shift of the upper criteria to the right of the dimension, as compared to the baseline presented in the middle panel.
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remaining 40 pairs were new. Twenty of these new pairs
consisted of a nonword as a cue and a legal word as a tar-
get. The other 20 pairs consisted of two unrelated words
not presented before. Different new pairs were presented
on the second and third cycles.
The study and test phase procedures were identical for
both groups. Before the study phase began, participants
were presented with instructions for the JOL task:
After the presentation of each pair you will be asked to
assess on a scale from 0 to 100% the probability that
you will recall at test the second word from this pair
when presented with the first word. For example, if
you are certain that you will recall this word, choose
‘100%’. If you are certain that you will not be able to
recall this word, choose ‘0%’.
At study, all pairs were presented individually for 1.5 s.
After the presentation of each pair, the target disappeared
from the screen, leaving only the cue. Participants were
then asked to rate the likelihood of recalling the target at
test when presented with the cue. They could type in any
value from 0% to 100%. Time for providing the judgment
was not limited.
The test immediately followed the study phase. All pairs
studied on a given cycle were included in the test. On each
test trial, participants were presented with a cue and their
task was to type in the target that accompanied that cue
during the study phase. If they were not able to recall the
target, they were asked to press ‘‘Continue” to advance to
the next cue. The order of presentation of pairs was ran-
domized anew for each participant on each study and test
phase.Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics for JOLs and recall performance for
critical and non-critical pairs are presented in Table 1. Res-
olution scores are presented in Table 2.
Cycle 1
On cycle 1, the materials that participants studied and
were tested on were the same in both groups. Therefore,
no differences between the groups were expected.
Nonetheless, we compared cycle-1 performance between
the two groups to eliminate the possibility of sampling
error. A 2 (group: control, experimental)  2 (measure:
JOL, recall) mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted
on both the critical and non-critical pairs, with group as
the only between-subjects variable, revealed only a signifi-
cant main effect of measure, F(1,58) = 10.639,
MSE = 174.07, p = .002, gp2 = .155. Mean JOLs (M = 35.89,
SD = 15.01) were higher than mean recall performance
(M = 28.03, SD = 11.45). Neither the main effect of group,
nor the interaction, was significant, both Fs < 1.
It was important to establish that performance for the
critical pairs, that were the focus on the main analyses
reported below, was also comparable between the experi-
mental and control groups in cycle 1. To establish this
comparability, we conducted the same 2  2 ANOVA on
cycle-1 JOL and recall results, only this time restricting
the analysis to the critical pairs. The pattern of results
was identical to that found for the full data set. There
was a significant main effect of measure, F(1,58) = 8.393,
MSE = 192.97, p = .005, gp2 = .126, with JOLs (M = 32.68,
SD = 16.68) exceeding recall performance (M = 25.33,
SD = 12.91). Neither the main effect of group, nor the
Table 1
Means (SDs) for JOLs and recall performance for critical and non-critical repeated pairs in the control and experimental groups and new word–word and
nonword–word pairs in the experimental group in Experiment 1.
Group and pair type Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3
JOL Recall JOL Recall JOL Recall
Control
Critical 33.05 (16.00) 25.00 (13.13) 38.32 (15.58) 55.83 (19.17) 59.58 (20.32) 73.50 (17.98)
Non-critical
Repeated 37.97 (15.00) 31.93 (10.77) 43.81 (14.62) 64.27 (15.50) 64.77 (17.97) 80.20 (14.38)
Experimental
Critical 32.32 (17.60) 25.33 (12.93) 46.26 (17.96) 58.00 (19.24) 68.18 (16.35) 74.00 (17.29)
Non-critical
Repeated 36.99 (14.91) 27.27 (13.87) – – – –
New word–word – – 31.27 (16.53) 43.00 (16.43) 34.18 (17.43) 41.33 (21.37)
New nonword–word – – 14.62 (12.48) 38.00 (13.43) 14.81 (11.45) 7.67 (10.06)
Note: The terms ‘‘repeated” and ‘‘new” refer to pair status on cycles 2 and 3; on cycle 1, all pairs are new.
Table 2
Means (SDs) for Ag for critical pairs in control and experimental groups in
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Experiment and group Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3
Experiment 1
Control .69 (.11) .77 (.12) .85 (.12)
Experimental .70 (.14) .79 (.11) .89 (.10)
Experiment 2
Control .63 (.15) .86 (.16) –
Experimental .64 (.16) .84 (.15) –
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difference in cycle-1 resolution (Ag, a nonparametric mea-
sure of AUC; Pollack, Norman, & Galanter, 1964) between
the experimental and control groups, t < 1. Taken together,
cycle 1 results confirm that baseline performance was
equal between the groups.
Cycle 2
First, we checked whether the difficulty manipulation
implemented in the experimental group was successful.
A repeated-measures ANOVA performed on mean JOLs
for three pair types (critical, new word–word, and new
nonword–word pairs), was significant, F(2,58) = 116.775,
MSE = 64.377, p < .001, gp2 = .801. JOLs for the critical pairs
were higher than those for new word–word pairs, t(29)
= 8.284, SE = 1.81, p < .001, d = 1.53, which were, in turn,
higher than those for new nonword–word pairs, t(29)
= 8.937, SE = 1.86, p < .001, d = 1.76 (see Table 1). This
result demonstrates that participants distinguished
between these types of pairs using their JOLs. A similar
ANOVA performed on the recall data for these pairs was
significant as well, F(2,58) = 36.840, MSE = 88.28, p < .001,
gp2 = .560. Recall performance for the three pair types mir-
rored the pattern for JOLs, with the critical pairs being
recalled more often than the new word–word pairs, t(29)
= 6.321, SE = 2.19, p < .001, d = 1.18, which were recalled
more often than the nonword–word pairs, t(29) = 2.276,
SE = 2.37, p = .030, d = 0.43.
All other analyses on the cycle 2 data were performed
for the 20 critical pairs only, which were identical for both
groups. Cycle 2 JOLs and recall performance for these pairs
were subjected to a 2 (group)  2 (measure) mixed ANOVA
that was analogous to the one conducted in cycle 1. Themain effect of measure was again significant, F(1,58)
= 40.431, MSE = 158.69, p < .001, gp2 = .411, only this time,
mean recall performance exceeded mean JOLs (M = 56.92,
SD = 19.06 and M = 42.29, SD = 17.15, respectively). Had
list context exerted an effect on JOLs in the predicted direc-
tion, JOLs should have been higher in the experimental
group than the control group whereas recall should have
been equated, producing an interaction. However,
although the data pattern was in the predicted direction
– that is, the mean difference between JOLs and recall per-
formance was numerically greater in the control (17.5%)
than in the experimental condition (11.7%; see Table 1
for the means) – neither the main effect of group nor the
interaction was significant, F(1,58) = 1.555, MSE = 492.78,
p = .22, gp2 = .026, and F(1,58) = 1.576, MSE = 158.69,
p = .21, gp2 = .026, respectively.
One potential reason that our between-group manipu-
lation of list composition did not exert a significant inter-
active pattern on cycle 2 performance is that in order for
the new pairs to be perceived as difficult, the level of per-
formance for old, critical pairs might need to be high
enough for participants to consider these pairs as easy.
Only then would experimental participants be inclined to
adjust their confidence criteria relative to the control
group. Although recall performance on cycle 2 for these
pairs was better than cycle 1, and better than for the
new, non-critical pairs introduced on cycle 2, it may not
have been high enough to warrant a criterion shift. How-
ever, cycle 3 performance should meet these requirements,
to which we now turn.
There was no between-group difference in resolution
(Ag) for critical pairs, t < 1 (see Table 2).
Cycle 3
As on cycle 2, a repeated-measures ANOVA performed
on mean JOLs for three pair types (critical, new word–
word, and new nonword–word pairs) studied in the exper-
imental group, was significant, F(2,58) = 197.613,
MSE = 110.79, p < .001, gp2 = .872. JOLs for the critical pairs
were higher than those for new word–word pairs, t(29)
= 11.384, SE = 2.99, p < .001, d = 2.08, which were, in turn,
higher than those for new nonword–word pairs, t(29)
= 9.172, SE = 2.11, p < .001, d = 1.91 (see Table 1). The same






























Fig. 4. Metacognitive receiver operating characteristic (MROC) curve for
Experiment 1 (top panel) and Experiment 2 (bottom panel). Dashed lines
link points denoting the same criteria in the control and experimental
group (the bottommost dashed line links the 100% criteria, the line
immediately above links the 90% criteria, etc.), so that the longer the line,
the greater the difference in criterion placement between the groups. The
overlap between the curves presented in each panel suggests comparable
resolution in both groups. The selective misalignment of points on the
two curves (from the top right corner to the middle of the curve in the top
panel, and in the bottom left corner in the bottom panel) suggests
criterion shifts.
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gp2 = .957. Recall performance again was the highest for
the critical pairs, which were recalled more often than
the new word–word pairs, t(29) = 11.611, SE = 2.81,
p < .001, d = 2.19. New word–word pairs were, in turn,
recalled more often than the nonword–word pairs, t(29)
= 10.869, SE = 3.09, p < .001, d = 2.48.
Cycle 3 JOLs and recall performance for critical pairs
were subjected to a 2 (group)  2 (measure) mixed ANOVA
that was analogous to the one conducted in cycles 1 and 2.
As with cycle 2, it revealed a significant main effect of mea-
sure, F(1,58) = 34.120, MSE = 85.70, p < .001, gp2 = .370,
again caused by the mean of JOLs being lower than recall
performance (M = 63.88, SD = 18.79 and M = 73.75,
SD = 17.48, respectively). However, unlike the cycle 2 anal-
ysis, the main effect was qualified by a significant mea-
sure  group interaction, F(1,58) = 5.740, MSE = 85.70,
p = .020, gp2 = .090: even though recall performance was
equated between the control and experimental groups,
participants in the experimental condition assigned higher
JOLs to the critical items than participants in the control
condition, decreasing the discrepancy between the two
measures (5.82% vs 13.92%; see Table 1). The main effect
of group was not significant, F(1,58) = 1.098,
MSE = 565.22, p = .30, gp2 = .019.
To examine the influence of difficult pairs on JOLs in
more detail, we constructed MROC curves for critical pairs
(see panel A of Fig. 4). We first compared resolution
between the groups. As seen in Fig. 4, the MROC curves
for the experimental and control groups overlap, which
suggests comparable levels of resolution. To confirm that,
we calculated Ag, which did not differ between the condi-
tions, t < 1. This result shows that our manipulation of list
difficulty did not impair participants’ ability to discrimi-
nate between subsequently recalled and unrecalled critical
items on cycle 3. Thus, neither resolution nor recall perfor-
mance differed between the groups, so neither variable is
able to explain the difference in JOLs found in cycle 3.
Another possible reason for why JOLs differed between
the groups is that the manipulation of list context affected
the confidence criteria. Specifically, the inclusion of new
pairs caused participants to recalibrate their confidence
scale such that the amount of evidence for future recall
warranting the assignment of particular JOL values was
adjusted (see Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Higham, 2014,
for similar considerations regarding RC ratings). Specifi-
cally, according to the SDT model, new, difficult pairs
would be located at a new, low end of the evidence dimen-
sion, extending the total range of evidence downward. To
accommodate these pairs, participants would have shifted
their lower confidence criteria downward as well. This
shifting is evidenced in the MROC in Fig. 4 by the liberal
(top-right) points being offset between the groups, with
the points in the experimental group being further to the
top-right of the MROC space (i.e., more liberal) than those
in the control group. The consequence of the lower-criteria
shifts was an increase in JOLs assigned to difficult critical
items (which are of only moderate difficulty in the exper-
imental group, occupying the middle of the evidence
range).On the other hand, the MROC in the top panel of Fig. 4
suggests criterion placements at the top end of the range
(the conservative region) were not affected as much by
the addition of new, difficult pairs. Indeed, the placements
of the highest confidence criteria (>60% – bottom-left area
of the MROC) are almost identical between the control and
experimental MROCs. This result is understandable
because criteria in this region of the evidence dimension
are far away from the region occupied by the new, difficult
items. Consequently, they do not need to be adjusted to
accommodate them and JOLs assigned to the easiest criti-
cal items remain unchanged.
In addition to the MROC analysis, c1, a criterion measure
suitable for cases in which the underlying distributions
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was calculated from group data for each criterion level.6
The differences in c1 scores between the experimental and
control groups are presented in Fig. 5.7 Overall, the results
are consistent with the selective criterion-shift account out-
lined above: in the experimental group, the lowest and mid-
dle criteria were shifted to a greater extent than the high
criteria. Therefore, it can be concluded that the increase of
the JOL mean in the experimental group as compared to
the control group was caused mostly by more liberal place-
ment of the criteria associated with 60% and below.
There is, however, more than one other mechanism that
could be responsible for the observed differences in JOLs
between the groups. According to the metacognitive con-
trast explanation (e.g., Pansky & Goldsmith, 2014; see also
Hansen & Wänke, 2008, for a related approach, and Criss,
2006, 2010, for a related concept of differentiation in recog-
nition memory), the inclusion of new pairs in the experi-
mental group may affect the perception of critical pairs:
when contrasted to new, difficult pairs, the critical pairs
seem easier than they really are. This effect would be rep-
resented in the SDT model as a distribution shift rather
than a criterion shift; that is, the inclusion of new difficult
pairs in the experimental group would cause the distribu-
tions of critical items to increase. As the perceived amount
of critical-item evidence for future recall increases, higher
confidence criteria are surpassed and thus higher JOL val-
ues are assigned. The fundamental difference between
the criterion shift and metacognitive contrast accounts lies,
therefore, in the accuracy of assessments that participants
make. Whereas in the former case participants still can
accurately assess the amount of evidence for future recall,
in the latter case, this assessment is distorted.
Crucially, it is possible to distinguish between the two
accounts by investigating the MROCs. If it is metacognitive
contrast that produces the difference in JOLs between the
experimental and control conditions on cycle 3 – that is,
in the experimental condition both unrecalled and recalled
critical items indeed seemed easier than they really were,
producing a distribution shift – the placement of all confi-
dence criteria should differ between the conditions. An
inspection of the MROCs reveals, however, that this is not
the case; as noted, the high confidence criteria shifted
noticeably less than the lower ones.
However, a more complex version of the metacognitive-
contrast account might be postulated. In principle, it is
conceivable that only the perception of pairs characterized
by a relatively low level of evidence for future recall would
be affected by the inclusion of difficult new pairs, as these
two types of pairs would be close to each other on the6 For technical reasons, we did not statistically analyze between-group
differences in criterion setting, as it was not possible to calculate measures
of criterion setting for each participant. Calculating measures such as c1
requires converting HRs and FARs to z scores. This, however, cannot be
done for HRs and FARs equaling either 1 or 0. As such HR and FAR values
were common, especially at low- and high-confidence levels, excluding
these cases would have led to substantial data loss. When corrections were
used to convert HRs and FARs equaling 0 or 1 to values that would allow
calculation of z scores, the resulting corrected data violated the normality
assumption, also precluding calculation of c1.
7 See Appendix for a full set of c1 scores across cycles and experiments.evidence dimension. If this were true, primarily the items
at the bottom end of the unrecalled item distribution
would shift upward. The items at the top end of this distri-
bution, as well as items within the recalled-item distribu-
tion (i.e., items with more evidence that are not as close to
the new, difficult pairs) would remain static. Such a selec-
tive shift upward would effectively reduce the variance of
the unrecalled item distribution in the experimental group
compared to the control group. Because MROCs are sensi-
tive to the ratio of the variances of the evidence distribu-
tions, the net result of this account, therefore, would be a
difference in the shape of the MROC between the groups.
However, a visual inspection of the MROCs shows that this
was not the case, as the shapes of both curves are virtually
identical. We conclude, therefore, that the metacognitive
contrast account is not a viable explanation for the present
set of results.Experiment 2
Experiment 1 was successful at demonstrating that if
new, difficult items were introduced on later cycles of the
multi-cycle paradigm, participants adjusted their confi-
dence criteria to accommodate them, which increased
mean JOLs assigned to critical items. The purpose of
Experiment 2 was to experimentally demonstrate that if
non-critical items set an easy (rather than hard) context,
participants’ attempts to accommodate these items will
result in lowered JOLs to critical items relative to the con-
trol condition in which easy, non-critical items are absent.
Furthermore, MROC analysis should demonstrate that the
reason for this effect is shifting of the upper confidence




Sixty-six students of the University of Southampton and
Cardiff University participated for course credit or pay-
ment. Thirty-three were assigned to the control group,
and 33 to the experimental group.
Materials and procedure
The procedure consisted of a pre-study phase and two
study-test cycles. The materials were the same as in Exper-
iment 1. Out of 60 word pairs used on cycle 1 of that exper-
iment, 15 were assigned to the pre-study condition, and
the remaining 45 were used in the multi-cycle procedure.
During the pre-study phase, participants studied and were
tested four times on a list of 15 unrelated cue–target pairs.
Repeated study was implemented so that these items
would be well learned. The study phases were the same
with each pair presented for 1.5 s with a 500 ms interstim-
ulus interval. The tests, however, were simple initially but
then gradually became more difficult to facilitate learning
(e.g., Finley, Benjamin, Hays, Bjork, & Kornell, 2011). The
first was a recognition test, where the cue was presented
and participants were supposed to choose the target from





















Fig. 5. Differences in c1 scores between the experimental and control group as a function of criterion in Experiments 1 (upper line) and 2 (bottom line).
Values above versus below 0 indicate more liberal versus more conservative responding in the experimental than in the control group, respectively.
Table 3
Means (SDs) for JOLs and recall performance for critical and non-critical repeated pairs in the control and experimental groups and non-critical new studied and
identical pairs in the experimental groups in Experiment 2.
Group and pair type Cycle 1 Cycle 2
JOL Recall JOL Recall
Control
Critical 44.66 (15.77) 35.56 (21.51) 51.90 (20.36) 60.81 (26.07)
Non-critical
Repeated 43.42 (14.86) 29.52 (18.93) 46.14 (19.25) 56.64 (24.31)
Experimental
Critical 43.88 (17.72) 38.99 (20.69) 47.21 (20.07) 64.44 (22.95)
Non-critical
Repeated 42.57 (15.62) 25.97 (16.99) – –
New studied – – 77.10 (20.26) 85.00 (19.08)
New identical – – 66.84 (20.07) 79.59 (18.78)
Note: The terms ‘‘repeated” and ‘‘new” refer to pair status on cycle 2, as on cycle 1 all pairs are new.
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sented along with the first letter of the target and partici-
pants were expected to type in the target. The third and
fourth tests were also cued recall, but only the cue was
presented with no target letter. These latter tests were
the same as those in the JOL phase of the experiment.
After the pre-study phase, 45 unrelated pairs were stud-
ied and tested in two cycles. On cycle 1, the same 45 pairs
were used in both the control and experimental groups. On
cycle 2, participants in the control group studied and were
tested on the same 45 pairs as on cycle 1. In the experi-
mental condition, 15 critical pairs were taken from the list
studied on cycle 1, and the remaining 30 pairs were new.
Fifteen of these new pairs were taken from the pre-study
phase of the experiment, and hence were highly familiar.
The remaining 15 new pairs consisted of cues and targets
that were identical (e.g., grass–grass; Castel, McCabe, &
Roediger, 2007). These new pairs were expected to elicit
high JOLs and set an easy context.
The procedure within each cycle was the same as in
Experiment 1, although note that there were only two
rather than three study-test cycles in this experiment com-
pared to the last (not counting the pre-study phase). Thereduction in the number of cycles and in the number of
pairs studied on each cycle was implemented to limit fati-
gue effects that might otherwise have arisen with the pre-
study phase that was added in this experiment. The order
of presentation of pairs within each cycle was randomized
anew for each participant on each study and test phase,
including the pre-study phase.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics for mean JOLs and recall perfor-
mance are presented in Table 3. Table 2 presents resolution
scores for critical pairs.
Pre-study phase
Only recall performance on the last test of the pre-study
phase was analyzed because the format of the last test was
identical to that used on the two main study-test cycles of
the experiment. On average, participants recalled correctly
13.2 (88%) out of the 15 tested items in the control group
(SD = 2.65), and 13.5 (90%) in the experimental group
(SD = 2.66), t < 1. Thus, our pre-test procedure was success-
ful at producing excellent learning of the items, meaning
8 Note that no theoretical account would predict the selective misalign-
ment only of the 10% criteria between the experimental and control groups.
Given that no other low-confidence criteria display this trend to a
comparable degree, we are inclined to treat this difference in criterion
setting as an example of a false positive.
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main experiment should create an easy context.
Cycle 1
As in Experiment 1, a 2 (measure: JOL, recall perfor-
mance)  2 (group: control, experimental) mixed ANOVA,
with group as the only between-subjects factor, was con-
ducted on the critical and non-critical pairs pooled
together. It revealed only a main effect of measure, F
(1,64) = 24.373, MSE = 215.468, p < .001, gp2 = .276: on
the first cycle, the JOL mean exceeded mean recall perfor-
mance (M = 43.42, SD = 15.37 vs M = 30.80, SD = 17.70).
Neither the main effect of group nor the interaction was
significant, both Fs < 1. The same ANOVA conducted on
the data for critical pairs only produced similar results.
Only the main effect of measure was significant, F(1,64)
= 5.136, MSE = 314.64, p = .027, gp2 = .074, with the JOL
mean exceeding mean recall performance (M = 44.27,
SD = 16.65 vs M = 37.27, SD = 21.02). Neither the main
effect of group nor the interaction was significant, both
Fs < 1. Resolution (Ag) also did not differ between the
groups, t < 1. These results demonstrate that the level of
performance before the introduction of the experimental
manipulation was equated between the groups.
Cycle 2
To confirm that the ‘‘easy” pairs in the experimental
group were indeed perceived as easier than the critical
pairs, a one-way ANOVA was performed on mean JOLs
for the three pair types: critical, identical, and studied.
The ANOVA revealed a significant effect, F(2,64) = 35.144,
MSE = 216.59, p < .001, gp2 = .523. Mean JOLs for critical
pairs were lower than for identical pairs, t(32) = 4.771,
SE = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.83, which were, in turn, lower than
those assigned to pairs taken from the pre-study phase, t
(32) = 2.701, SE = 3.80, p = .011, d = 0.47. The same ANOVA
conducted on recall data also revealed a significant effect, F
(2,64) = 20.045,MSE = 187.532, p < .001, gp2 = .385. As with
JOLs, recall was lower for critical than for identical pairs, t
(32) = 3.887, SE = 3.89, p < .001, d = 0.68. The difference in
recall performance between the identical pairs and pairs
from the pre-study phase was marginally significant, t
(32) = 1.721, SE = 3.17, p = .095, d = 0.30, with higher recall
performance for pairs from the pre-study list.
Although the results for new pairs are not the focus of
the present study, two interesting aspects of the data for
identical pairs are worth noting. First, identical pairs, at
least on the surface, should seem easier to learn than pairs
from the pre-study phase. However, this was not the case:
JOLs for pairs from the pre-study phase exceeded those for
identical pairs. The most parsimonious explanation of that
result is that the previously studied pairs were learned so
well that at this stage of the experiment they simply did
not require additional learning. Words constituting identi-
cal pairs, on the other hand, had not been encountered
before in the course of the experiment. Hence, these pairs
required encoding on cycle 2. This is consistent with the
recall results: the difference in recall performance between
pre-studied and identical pairs was in the same direction
as the difference in JOLs and marginally significant. Second,
in contrast to Castel et al. (2007), who found that JOLs foridentical pairs overestimated recall performance, in our
data we found a 14% underestimation, as participants were
able to recall correctly almost 80% of targets after a single
presentation. A potential explanation of the excellent recall
performance is that identical pairs stood out during the
test phase: these were the only pairs in which cues (and
identical targets) were not highly familiar. Both the critical
and repeated pairs had been encountered before – either
during the pre-study phase, or on cycle 1 – while the iden-
tical pairs were new to participants. Therefore, participants
might have simply adopted the strategy of providing a tar-
get that was the same as the cue whenever they encoun-
tered a relatively unfamiliar cue at test.
The remaining analyses on cycle-2 data were performed
on the 15 critical pairs only. The same measure x group
ANOVA as on cycle 1 was performed on cycle 2 JOL and
recall data for critical pairs. Again, the main effect of mea-
sure was significant, F(1,64) = 49.009, MSE = 115.06,
p < .001, gp2 = .434, although this time the mean of JOLs
underestimated mean recall performance (M = 49.55,
SD = 20.27 vs M = 62.63, SD = 24.44). Crucially, the interac-
tion was significant as well, F(1,64) = 4.965, MSE = 115.06,
p = .029, gp2 = .072: the difference between the JOL and
recall means increased with the inclusion of new, easy
pairs in the experimental group (17.23%) compared to
the control group (8.91%). The main effect of group was
not significant, F < 1.
As in Experiment 1, we plotted and compared MROCs
for both groups (see panel B of Fig. 4). However, this time,
the data were from cycle 2 rather than cycle 3. Again, the
two curves were similar, suggesting comparable resolu-
tion. This was confirmed by the comparison of Ag, which
did not differ between the groups, t < 1. As in Experiment
1, selective criterion shifts seem to be the only viable
explanation of our results. As evidenced by the MROCs,
the placement of the criteria between 70% and 100%
(bottom-left corner) consistently differed between the
groups by one criterion: the amount of evidence needed
for a rating of 70% in the experimental group warranted a
rating of 80% in the control group, and the same applied
to the other, higher criteria up to the end of the scale.
The lower criteria, on the other hand, mostly overlap
between the groups, the only exception being the 10% cri-
terion (see also Fig. 5).8
The MROCs are again not consistent with the metacog-
nitive contrast account for the same reasons as in Experi-
ment 1. Specifically, if the entire distribution of items
was shifted by the presence of the easy items (i.e., critical
items had less subjective evidence of later recall in the
experimental group compared to the control group), then
there would not be selective misalignment of only the con-
servative points on the MROCs. Rather, all points on the
MROC would be misaligned. Conversely, if only the critical
items high on the dimension were shifted to a lesser point
on the dimension, then the ratio of variances would be
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Overall, the results of Experiment 2 confirm the finding
of Experiment 1 that manipulating context with non-
critical items influences certain criterion settings in the
JOL task.9
In Experiment 2, we reversed the pattern obtained in
Experiment 1. By introducing new, easy pairs, we
increased, rather than decreased, the discrepancy between
the means of JOLs and recall performance. As evidenced by
the MROCs, the context manipulation made the high crite-
ria in the experimental group more conservative. These
results support the claim that JOLs are relative in nature,
and the mapping between the internal evidence for future
recall and JOL values depends on the context in which the
judgments are made.
General discussion
In the present study, we employed signal-detection
methods to analyze responding in the multi-cycle JOL task.
By treating JOL levels as separate confidence criteria, we
have demonstrated that the assignment of particular JOL
values is context dependent, and it is influenced by the
range of evidence for future recall for all items on the study
list. In Experiment 1, the inclusion of difficult, new pairs in
the experimental group extended the range downward,
compared to the control group, affecting the positioning
of the low and middle (660%) confidence criteria. In Exper-
iment 2, the range was extended upward by the easy new
pairs, consistently affecting the high (P70%) confidence
criteria. Importantly, these recalibration effects occurred
in spite of the lack of differences in resolution, as evi-
denced by Ag values. The fact that JOL values can be treated
as confidence criteria that are malleable and context
dependent speaks against the objective interpretation of
the 0–100% JOL scale.
We suggest instead a more parsimonious explanation
that JOLs represent the ranking of the items within the list
in terms of evidence for future recall. For such an interpre-
tation, only one assumption concerning the subjective rat-
ing scale is necessary: the order of confidence criteria on
the dimension should be impervious to experimental
manipulations (i.e., the rating of 40% should always be
higher than 30% and lower than 50%, etc.). We suspect that
this assumption is satisfied in a great majority of cases,
which makes interpreting 0–100% JOLs as relative mea-
sures of confidence a reasonable option.
Recalibration and the UWP effect
In the present study, we used the multi-cycle procedure
to create baseline conditions on cycle 1, and then demon-9 It has to be noted, however, that an alternative explanation of our
results can be postulated. As our analyses were performed on averaged
data, it is viable that a concordant shift of all – rather than selected –
criteria might have occurred for some participants, but not for others. In
Experiment 1, a subset of more conservative participants might have
become more liberal, while in Experiment 2 some more liberal participants
might have become more conservative. Although unlikely, this alternative
account cannot be excluded on the basis of the current set of data. (We
thank David Huber for this suggestion.)strated that when an experimental manipulation is intro-
duced, the placement of certain JOL criteria on the
subsequent cycles can be affected. It seems viable, though,
that in the UWP paradigm, recalibration of the percentage
JOL scale occurs naturally even when no changes to the
procedure are made between the cycles. As items are
repeated across the different cycles, there are likely
changes in the range of evidence for future recall and these
changes could cause recalibration effects even though no
new items are added to the list. Here we outline how the
UWP effect – the finding of impaired calibration with prac-
tice – may at least partially be driven by recalibration.
Consider the multi-cycle paradigm from the perspective
of SDT. On all cycles, participants study and are tested on
the same list of word pairs. As the procedure progresses
from one cycle to the next, memory performance for the
study list improves. As a result, the two distributions pre-
sented in Fig. 1 shift toward the right end of the scale.
Moreover, resolution increases (e.g., Ariel & Dunlosky,
2011; Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Hanczakowski, Zawadzka,
et al., 2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015), which is repre-
sented in the SDT model as a gradual decrease in the
degree of overlap of the distributions from cycle to cycle,
as the distribution of recalled items separates from the
unrecalled items distribution. This extends the range of
evidence for future recall for the items populating these
distributions. As a result, it creates space for the recalibra-
tion effects to occur. This is akin to Experiment 2 from our
study, inasmuch as the range of evidence is extended
upward from cycle to cycle.
An example of recalibration at the item level is pre-
sented in Fig. 6. The top panel of Fig. 6 represents the range
of evidence for future recall on cycle 1, which can be
thought of as baseline. On cycle 2, most items gain evi-
dence for future recall compared to cycle 1. However, this
gain can be greater for some of the studied items (see e.g.,
Wixted, 2007); as a result, the range of evidence gets
extended (middle panel). The range of evidence is
extended even further in cycle 3 (bottom panel).
In order to accommodate this change in the range of
evidence, the rating scale may be recalibrated. Consider
items A and B in Fig. 6 taken from a hypothetical study list.
As shown in the top panel, during the first study/JOL phase,
the evidence for future recall is comparable for items A and
B, so both items get the same rating of 50%. The evidence
for both items increases from cycle 1 to cycle 2, although
not to the same extent. Item A gains less than item B,
and therefore their ratings diverge: item A gets a rating
of 60%, while item B is now assigned a 100% rating. As
the procedure progresses to the next cycle, evidence for
these items changes again. Item B gets strengthened even
more, and retains the highest rating of 100%. Item A also
gains considerable evidence for future recall, and now
the evidence available for this item is comparable to that
of item B on the preceding cycle. However, as the range
of evidence increased between cycles 2 and 3, more items
surpass the evidence for item A on cycle 3 than item B on
cycle 2, rendering item A weaker than B between cycles
given the changing context of the study list. As a result,
the rating assigned to item A on cycle 3 is lower than that
of item B on the preceding cycle: 80% compared to 100%.
Fig. 6. A graphical presentation of the UWP effect. Three study-test cycles are shown in the three panels: cycle 1 in the top panel, cycle 2 in the middle panel
and cycle 3 in the bottom panel. The horizontal lines in each panel represent the range of evidence for the studied items. The dashed vertical lines represent
confidence criteria in increments of 10.
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same absolute level of evidence in the between-cycle
comparison.
Moreover, as the procedure progresses, more items gain
more evidence, resulting in a cluster of items with high
evidence. If participants want to rank order these items
in terms of their evidence for future recall, the more strong
items there are, the more fine-grained the distinctions
between them need to be. Consequently, criteria for the
highest JOL values are drawn toward the top end of the
dimension. This may lead to some items with high (but
not the highest) levels of evidence being assigned rela-
tively low JOLs, as the higher ratings are reserved for items
positioned even further to the right of the dimension.
The key to interpreting the UWP effect in terms of recal-
ibration is to realize that the change in the mapping
between the scale values and underlying evidence from
cycle to cycle is not accompanied by any changes in the
perceived likelihood of recalling the studied items. The
result is that the JOL mean for items that share the same
subjective probability of recall should decrease from cycle
to cycle. For example, the mean rating for the subset of
items occupying the same location on the evidence dimen-
sion could well be 75% on cycle 1, 70% on cycle 2 and 65% on
cycle 3. Consequently, if the mean of all JOLs on later cycles
is calculated, it falls below that for memory performance.
Traditionally, this would be interpreted as underconfi-
dence. However, this result may simply be a result of scale
recalibration over cycles and have nothing to do with
‘‘true” underconfidence.
Note that the recalibration account can potentially
explain the differential effects of repeated practice on res-
olution and calibration. Recall that in the UWP paradigm,
resolution improves from cycle to cycle (e.g., Finn &
Metcalfe, 2007, 2008; Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al.,
2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015), while calibration wors-
ens. For calculating resolution, a subjective scale is suffi-
cient. As long as selective criterion shifts do not lead to
changes in the ordering of the criteria on the evidence
dimension, the measure of resolution should not be
affected by the changes in the range of evidence for the
studied items. Calibration, on the other hand, requires anobjective scale, a requirement that is likely not met. There-
fore, calibration results cannot be meaningfully interpreted
as reflecting under- or overconfidence.
Our recalibration account may also provide an explana-
tion for why the UWP effect is found with 0–100% scale
JOLs, but not binary yes/no JOLs or binary betting decisions
(Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, et al., 2013; Zawadzka &
Higham, 2015). Unlike 0–100% scale JOLs, binary judg-
ments require only one criterion (‘‘yes/no” or ‘‘bet/no
bet”); shifting this single criterion to a more conservative
position to accommodate new learning would result in
an unacceptably high metacognitive miss rate (i.e., high
proportion of recalled items assigned negative responses).
This willingness to shift higher confidence criteria further
up the evidence dimension if making 0–100% scale JOLs
coupled with an unwillingness to shift a single criterion
upward if making binary judgments results in a scale/bin-
ary dissociation (although see Experiment 3 of Zawadzka &
Higham, 2015, for an exception to this dissociative
pattern).Implications for interpreting other metacognitive ratings and
individual differences
As discussed above, the interpretation of the percentage
JOL scale as context dependent can pose problems for
experimenters employing 0–100% JOLs in their research.
However, in our view, there is no fundamental difference
between the percentage JOL scale and other rating scales
that would limit recalibration effects to 0–100% JOLs.
Indeed, past research suggests that recalibration effects
can be also found in measures other than JOLs elicited on
a percentage scale. One such an example comes from a
study by Mickes, Hwe, Wais, and Wixted (2011) who
investigated scaling of items high on the evidence dimen-
sion in the context of recognition memory judgments.
Feedback, which was administered in their Experiment 5,
made participants recalibrate their rating scale by making
the highest confidence criteria more conservative. Given
the ubiquity of feedback manipulations in memory and
metamemory studies (e.g., Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012;
Koriat, 1997; McGillivray & Castel, 2011; Rhodes &
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Button, Higham, & Hanczakowski, 2016), its potential for
producing recalibration effects certainly warrants future
research, with particular focus on the generalizability to
other rating types.
Recalibration effects may not only generalize to other
rating scales, but may also account for observed differ-
ences in realism between populations. For example, com-
pared to younger adults, older adults have been shown to
be prone to poor memory accuracy. Their metacognitive
ratings, on the other hand, do not seem to reflect this
decline, leading to apparent overconfidence (e.g., Connor
et al., 1997; Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007).
McDonough, Cervantes, Gray, and Gallo (2014) followed
up on these findings with an fMRI study which compared
older and younger adults’ memory and subjective recollec-
tion assessments (made on a 0-to-3 scale) for complex pic-
tures. In their experiment, older and younger participants
studied complex pictures accompanied by verbal labels.
At test, labels were presented one at the time and partici-
pants’ task was to recollect as many aspects of the picture
studied with a given label as possible, and give a rating of
the amount of detail recollected on a scale from 0 (no
detail) to 3 (high detail). As shown by behavioral data,
younger adults outperformed older adults on the memory
task. Consistent with the behavioral results, the fMRI data
suggested greater perceptual reactivation from memory in
younger adults. Despite these objective differences in rec-
ollection, subjective ratings of recollected details were
comparable between the age groups.
McDonough et al. (2014) presented a recalibration
account of their findings, by which older adults adjust their
rating scale to the lower quality of information retrieved
from memory. In this way, even though older participants
recollected less information about the studied pictures,
this was not reflected in their subjective ratings of recollec-
tion due to their rating criteria being more liberal than
those of younger adults. The authors noted that their
results ‘‘highlight the difficulty of using subjective report
as an index of the amount of actual detail retrieved from
memory in different groups” (p. 356).
It is therefore clear that the problem with the interpre-
tation of ratings is more general, as it applies not only to
the percentage JOL task used in the present study, but to
other tasks and rating scales as well. It can also be caused
both by experimental manipulations, and by testing groups
of participants differing on a particular dimension such as
memory capability. We believe that plotting MROCs to cor-
roborate the results may be a good strategy in such cases.
As demonstrated in the present study, MROCs can help dis-
tinguish between effects caused by selective criterion
shifts and actual changes in internal assessments. In this
way, making spurious interpretations of ratings data can
potentially be avoided.
Limitations of the SDT approach
As we have shown, the signal-detection approach can
be a useful tool for distinguishing between differences in
ratings stemming from criterion shifts (traditionally
thought of as a form of metacognitive control) and changesin perceived level of evidence for future recall of the rated
items (reflecting metacognitive monitoring). Indeed, by
analyzing the nature of the MROCs, we were able to suc-
cessfully eliminated a metacognitive contrast account of
our data, an account which would fall in the latter cate-
gory. However, in this study, we have considered only a
case where the placement of a subset of the criteria is
influenced by a manipulation, while the remaining criteria
remain unaffected, as shown on an MROC. Yet, as noted
above, there are other cases that do not allow for such
clean conclusions. In theorizing on the usefulness of SDT,
it has been noted that it is sometimes not possible to dis-
tinguish between criterion shifts and concordant distribu-
tion shifts (e.g., Goldsmith, 2011; Higham, 2011). A
concordant distribution shift requires the two distributions
to move in lockstep, preserving the distance between the
means. In this way, discrimination – and, consequently,
the shape of the MROC – is unaffected. As the placement
of the criterion is measured relative to the distributions,
it does not matter whether it is the criterion or the distri-
butions that change their position on the dimension: in
both cases, the points on the MROC and measures of crite-
rion placement are affected in the same way. However, as
noted above, we believe these to be ideal cases that are
unlikely to occur often in reality. Rather, it seems more
likely that only a portion of the items and/or criteria will
be affected by an experimental manipulation as was the
case in our data. If so, SDT is a valuable tool for discriminat-
ing between real changes in perception of the to-be-rated
items on the one hand versus scale recalibration on the
other.
A stochastic detection and retrieval model of JOLs
In the present paper, we used a signal detection model
to gain insight into the interpretation of scale JOLs. How-
ever, it has to be noted that there are alternative models
that are capable of capturing the complexities of scale
JOL assignment. One such signal detection-like model has
been proposed by Jang, Wallsten, and Huber (2012) and
dubbed the Stochastic Detection and Retrieval Model
(SDRM). In this model, it is assumed that there are two sep-
arate samplings from memory for each item. One of these
samplings underlies retrieval from memory, while the
other one allows a metacognitive rating to be assigned. If
the memory sampling returns a strength value above a
retrieval threshold, an item is recalled; otherwise, retrieval
fails. For the metacognitive sampling, the value returned
determines the confidence rating in much the same way
that the amount of subjective evidence determines confi-
dence in the SDT model. The correlation between the two
samplings constitutes one of the parameters in the SDRM.
It can be very high when the overlap between the memory
information at retrieval and at rating is also high. It can
also be low if, for example, memory deteriorates between
the two samplings. As the order of the two samplings is
irrelevant, the SDRM can be applied to prospective and ret-
rospective metacognitive judgments alike.
The SDRM model shares some of the qualities with the
SDT model of JOLs presented here. Contrary to Jang et al.’s
(2012) claim, both SDRM and SDT do not require indepen-
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studied items in recognition memory paradigms), but can
be applied also to tasks in which stimuli are classified on
the basis of participants’ responses (such as successful/
unsuccessful recall or correct/incorrect answer; see, e.g.,
Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Ferrell & McGoey, 1980; Galvin,
Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Higham, 2007, 2013). Also,
applications of SDT to prospective judgments such as JOLs
or FOKs (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Masson & Rotello, 2009)
necessarily require two separate samplings from memory
to be made – one at the time of the judgment, and the
other at test.
The main difference between the two models lies in the
nature of the distributions underlying the memory deci-
sions and metamemory ratings. As shown in Fig. 1, the
SDT model of JOLs assumes two separate distributions for
recalled and unrecalled items, with the recalled items dis-
tribution positioned to the right of the unrecalled items
distribution. In the SDRM, on the other hand, a single dis-
tribution is postulated. This distribution is further split into
two parts by a recall criterion, with recalled items falling to
the right of the criterion, and unrecalled items to the left.
This assumption makes the SDRM robust, as the model
can also be applied to tasks which do not satisfy the
requirement of having underlying normal distributions. It
is worth noting here, however, that JOL data, when split
into recalled/unrecalled categories, tend to be normally
distributed (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008), satisfying the normal-
ity assumption necessary for calculating SDT measures.10
We would argue that both models have the potential to
enhance our understanding of the bases of metacognitive
judgments above and beyond that which can be gleaned
from experimental data. Apart from the similarities dis-
cussed above, both the SDRM and the SDT model of JOLs
have strengths that the other model does not possess.
The SDT model, by the virtue of being based on two under-
lying distributions, allows for plotting MROCs, which, as
shown in the present study, can be a useful tool for theory
testing. The SDRM, on the other hand, deals with criterion
noise (see, e.g., Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009; Mueller &
Weidemann, 2008) – that is, inconsistency in criterion set-
ting across trials – by including a criterion noise parameter
that is absent in SDT.11Conclusion
In the present study, we have shown how applying the
SDT model to 0–100% JOL data allows for formulating and
testing new predictions regarding the mechanisms respon-
sible for JOL assignment. By plotting MROCs, we have
demonstrated that list composition can lead to a selective
recalibration of some – but not all – JOL criteria, without
affecting the perceived difficulty of the studied items. This
recalibration account of JOLs is consistent with previous
findings (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Hanczakowski, Zawadzka,10 Higham (2007) found that the normality assumption was satisfied with
RC ratings as well.
11 Criterion noise increases with an increase in response scale length
(Benjamin, Tullis, & Lee, 2013), which might be especially problematic for
scales with multiple response options such as the 0–100% JOL scale.et al., 2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015) suggesting that
JOL assignment does not have to be based on the assessed
probability of future recall. We suggest that the SDT
approach used in this study can be applied with success
to other rating tasks to help distinguish between compet-
ing theoretical accounts.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jml.2016.04.005.
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